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Analysis of Illinois' Restrictions on the Practice
of Law by Out-of-State Attorneys: Pro Hac
Vice Model Rule Proposal
INTRODUCTION
The interstate practice of law in the United States has rapidly
increased in recent years.' Today, the operations of many busi-
nesses extend across the country.2 Individuals have also become
more mobile.' As a result, many attorneys have found it necessary
to practice law in more than one state.' In order to practice law in
another state, attorneys must obtain authorization.' Unauthorized
practice of law by an attorney is a violation of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility6 and it can have some very serious con-
1. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH MEMORANDUM SERIES
No. 18, LAWYER MIGRATIONS (1960); Brakel, A Look at Multistate Practice Restrictions,
60 A.B.A. J. 1084 (1974); Note, Attorneys. Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1711 (1967).
2. See generally Morris, State Borders: Unnecessary Barriers to Effective Law Practice,
53 A.B.A. J. 530, 531 (1967) (demand for interstate bar because of the increase in na-
tional business relationships).
3. Much of clients' business crosses state lines. People are mobile, moving from
state to state. Many metropolitan areas cross state lines. It is common today to
have a single economic and social community involving more than one state.
The business of a single client may involve legal problems in several states.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 316 (1967); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ("Model Code") EC 3-9 (1980).
4. See generally Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH.
L. REV. 699 (1975). Brakel & Loh noted that "multistate or interstate practice by attor-
neys in this country is an expanding phenomenon." Id.; see also Note, supra note 1, at
1711. The note discusses the many reasons why attorneys are increasingly "required" to
cross state lines in their practice of law.
5. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, 1 (1983). The statute states in part that "No
person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor at law within this State
without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from the Supreme Court of
this State."
6. Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 3-101 states:
Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law.
(A) A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.
(B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in
violation of regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction.
MODEL CODE DR 3-101. Ethical Consideration ("EC") 3-9 states:
Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in any jurisdiction is not
per se a grant of the right to practice elsewhere, and it is improper for a lawyer
to engage in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so
MODEL CODE EC 3-9. The Model Rules provide:
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sequences to the out-of-state attorney.7
Every state establishes its own requirements for an out-of-state
attorney to become authorized to practice law in the jurisdiction.8
Illinois provides out-of-state attorneys with several alternatives to
obtain the authorization necessary to practice law in Illinois. 9
Nevertheless, an out-of-state attorney seeking to enter Illinois to
conduct activities involving no court appearance will find that the
Illinois rules lack any practical method to grant such authoriza-
tion."° Consequently, the right to counsel of Illinois citizens is
"A lawyer shall not:
(a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal
profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT ("MODEL RULES") Rule 5.5 (1983).
7. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, 1 (1983) ("Any person practicing, charging or re-
ceiving fees for legal services within this State, either directly or indirectly, without being
licensed to practice as herein required, is guilty of contempt of court and shall be pun-
ished accordingly."); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 32-35 (1983) ("A person who falsely
represents himself to be an attorney authorized to practice. . . commits a class B misde-
meanor."); see also People v. Peters, 10 Ill. 2d 577, 141 N.E.2d 9 (1957) (punishment of
fine of $500 and confinement in county jail for 90 days, imposed on lawyer convicted of
unauthorized practice of law, was held not to be excessive.); People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Barasch, 338 Ill. App. 169, 86 N.E.2d 868 (1949) (where former member of bar
was convicted of practicing law without a license, 60-day jail sentence and a fine of $200
and costs was not an excessive punishment), af'd, 406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E.2d 148 (1950).
8. See Leis v. Flint, 439 U.S. 438 (1979). "Since the founding of the Republic, the
licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the states and the District
of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions. The states prescribe the qualifications
for admission to practice and the standards of professional conduct. They also are re-
sponsible for the discipline of lawyers." Id. at 442; see also Saier v. State Bar of Mich.,
293 F.2d 756, 759 (6th Cir. 1961) ("license to practice law, the continuation of such
license, regulation of the practice and the procedure for disbarment and discipline are all
matters within the province of an individual state"); Dixon v. Georgia Indigent Legal
Serv., Inc. 388 F. Supp. 1156, 1162 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (regulation of the practice of law in
state courts within state's legislative and judicial province.)
9. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 704, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, 704 (1983) (Qualification on
Examination); ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 705, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, 705 (1983) (Qualifica-
tion on Foreign License); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 707, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, 707 (1983)
(Foreign Attorneys in Isolated Cases).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 77-91. Rules of law are deficient if they are
not just, understandable, and responsive to the needs of society. If a lawyer believes that
the existence or absence of a rule of law, substantive or procedura, causes or contributes
to an unjust result, he should endeavor by lawful means to obtain appropriate changes in
the law. He should encourage the simplification of laws and the repeal or amendment of
laws that are outmoded. Likewise, legal procedures should be improved whenever expe-
rience indicates a change is needed. MODEL CODE EC 8-2. "There are few great figures
in the history of the Bar who have not concerned themselves with the reform and im-
provement of the law. The special obligation of the profession with respect to legal re-
form rests on considerations too obvious to require enumeration. Certainly it is the
lawyer who has both the best chance to know when the law is working badly and the
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often restricted by the unavailability of out-of-state counsel."I The
authorization requirements are also, at times, unfair to out-of-state
attorneys themselves when they seek to practice law in Illinois on a
very limited basis.12 Further, the restrictions on out-of-state attor-
neys are difficult to enforce, and therefore encourage
noncompliance. 13
This note reviews the justifications on which states have relied in
restricting the practice of law by out-of-state attorneys. It then
discusses the restrictions placed on out-of-state attorneys wishing
to practice law in Illinois on a limited basis, and examines the bur-
dens current Illinois law places on the interstate practice of law.
Next, it illustrates the ethical predicament in which out-of-state
attorneys are placed when they practice law on an interstate basis
special competence to put it in order." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1217 (1958).
11. Any legal work done before the case is actually filed is considered to be out-of-
court practice of law. It appears that no state provides a method for out-of-state attor-
neys' out-of-court practice of law. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CODE R. 983
(West 1984) (a non-member of the State Bar of California who is a member in good
standing of and eligible to practice before any United States court or of the highest court
in any state, and who has been in a court of this state, may in the discretion of such court
be permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice); MICH. CT. R. 15 § 2 (R. Concerning
State Bar of Mich.) (any person who is duly licensed to practice in another state may be
permitted to engage in the trial of a specific case in a court or before an administrative
tribunal in this state); IOWA CODE ANN. § 610.13 (West 1984) ("Any member of the bar
of another state, actually engaged in any cause or matter pending in any court of this
state, may be permitted by such court to appear in and conduct such cause or matter").
WIs. S. CT. R. ch. 10 § 3(4) (judge in this state may allow a nonresident counsel to
appear in his or her court and participate in a particular action or proceeding); N.Y. Ct.
App. R. 520.9(e) (attorney from another state may be admitted pro hac vice in the discre-
tion of the court of record, to participate in the trial or argument of any particular cause
in which the attorney may be for the time being employed). See also Smith, Time for a
National Practice of Law Act, 64 A.B.A. J. 557 (1978). Smith, former president of the
American Bar Association, noted that "the present rules which require the passing of a
bar examination and admission to the bar in each state in which lawyers wish to practice
regularly are an intolerable and impractical restriction of the present-day practice of law,
on the development of needed national law practice, and on the legal needs of national,
commercial, financial, and industrial business entities." Id.
12. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 96-102. This note is limited to examining
Illinois' regulations on admitting out-of-state attorneys to Illinois state courts. This note
should, however, also have a substantial impact on admission into federal courts in Illi-
nois because federal courts often adopt state admission rules. See Brakel & Loh, supra
note 4, at 717-18. Brakel & Loh noted that in the absence of a unified or uniform federal
bar comparable to state bars, each federal court has its own admission standards. The
United State Supreme Court and Federal Courts of Appeals typically admit attorneys
upon a showing of authorization to practice before the highest court of any state. Federal
district court rules also give similar deference to state admission rules. About fifteen
district courts offer general admission to any attorney. Forty-five require membership in
the bar of the state where the district court sits. Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
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while still trying to follow the regulations. This note recommends
that Illinois recognize the increase in interstate practice of law and
update its rules on admission of out-of-state attorneys in order to
effectively protect Illinois citizens. A model rule will be proposed
for an authorization scheme for out-of-state attorneys who want to
practice law in Illinois. The rule proposed would allow an out-of-
state attorney to practice in Illinois on a limited basis provided that
the attorney's home state accorded a similar privilege to Illinois
attorneys.
BACKGROUND
Each state has the authority to determine who shall practice law
within its boundaries. 14 No absolute right to practice law in a state
exists.I5  The only limitation on the states' discretion is that the
method of selection must not violate a right secured by the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution. 16
Because the attorney is characterized as an officer of the court,
admission to practice law is generally controlled by the supreme
14. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (that the states have broad power to regulate the practice of law is
beyond question); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234, 237 (S.D. Ill. 1975)
(state has great interest in control and supervision of practice of law in its own courts
through reasonable requirements for licensing and admission); Doe v. Board on Profes-
sional Responsibility of Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 717 F.2d 1424, 1428, 230
U.S. App. D.C. 367, 371 (1983) (state courts, including courts of the District of Colum-
bia, possess exclusive authority to regulate discipline and admission to their respective
state bars); see supra note 8.
15. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5. (1957). The
Court noted: "We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a 'right'
or 'privilege'. Regardless of how the state's grant of permission to engage in this occupa-
tion is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practic-
ing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the state's
grace." Id.; see also People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Baker, 311 Ill. 66, 142 N.E. 554
(1924) (the right to practice law is not an absolute right).
16. E.g., Schware, 353 U.S. 232. "A state cannot exclude a person from the practice
of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 238-39. For
admission to the bar, a state can require high standards of qualification, such as good
moral character or proficiency in its law, but any such qualification must have a rational
I oueULion to the appiicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Moreover, even when
permissible standards are applied, a state cannot exclude an applicant when there is no
basis for a finding that he or she fails to meet the standards or when the denial is invidi-
ously discriminatory. Id. at 239. Recently, the Supreme Court has changed from the
rational relationship test stated in Schware to a "substantial relationship" test. Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985). According to the Piper court,
a state may discriminate against nonresident attorneys only where its reasons are substan-
tial and the difference in treatment bears a close or substantial relationship to those rea-
sons. Id. at 1279.
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court of each state. I7 The state supreme courts thus prescribe rules
and regulations for the study of law and the admission of appli-
cants to the practice of law.' 8 Traditionally, courts have been very
reluctant to find a state regulation on the practice of law to be
unconstitutional. 19
Most of the rules and regulations restricting an attorney's ability
to practice law interstate were originally developed during the
early 1900's.2" Interstate law problems were rare because society
as a whole was not very mobile.2' States were usually justified in
being cautious when an out-of-state attorney came into their juris-
diction to practice law, because an out-of-state attorney would
often enter a state, take advantage of a client, and leave the state
before anything could be done.2 2 Moreover, the virtual absence of
an interstate discipline reporting system meant it was rare for one
state to gain knowledge of an attorney's violations in other states.23
17. E.g., Bassi v. Langloss, 22 Ill. 2d 190, 194, 174 N.E.2d 682, 684 (1961) (Illinois
Supreme Court has the inherent power to regulate the conduct of members of the legal
profession); see also PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES, STAN-
DARD 2.1 (1979). Standard 2.1 states: "Responsibility of State's Highest Court. Ultimate
and exclusive responsibility within a state for the structure and administration of the
lawyer discipline and disability system and the disposition of individual cases is within
the inherent power of the highest court of the state."
18. E.g., In re Reynolds, 32 Ill. 2d 331, 205 N.E.2d 429 (1965). The Reynolds court
noted that a state can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral charac-
ter or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification
must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.
But see supra note 16 regarding the Piper decision.
19. See Comment, Commerce Clause Challenge to State Restrictions on Practice by
Out-of-State Attorneys, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 737 (1977). In general, state restrictions
against out-of-state attorneys have been upheld as legitimate exercises of the states' power
to protect their citizens. These restrictions have been attacked under various constitu-
tional provisions: right to travel, sixth amendment right to counsel, and fourteenth
amendment guarantee of due process of the laws. Id. at 743 n.36. But see Piper, 105 S.
Ct. at 1280-81, where the Supreme Court held that New Hampshire's residency require-
ment violated the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.
20. See, e.g., R. BURKETT, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW AND THE LAWYER-
TOWARDS A UNIFORM APPROACH TO INTERSTATE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 1 (1984) (the fundamental assumptions behind these rules are rooted in the legal
and social realities of the roaring twenties) Robert Burkett is a former director of Unau-
thorized Practice Division of the State Bar of California and a past member of the ABA
Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law.
21. See Brakel, supra note 1, at 1. Brakel notes that multistate practice problems are
increasing today in direct proportion to the increase in people's mobility.
22. Brakel also notes that many restrictions on multistate practice have their origin in
the preconstitutional era. Many of these restrictions were framed against the background
of the dated situation when lawyer mobility was suspect. Id.
23. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
"THE CLARK REPORT" (Final Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as THE CLARK REPORT].
The committee acknowledged instances in which attorneys admitted to practice in several
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An attorney suspended or disbarred in one state could practice law
freely in another state. 24 Another problem was the widely diver-
gent substantive and procedural laws of the various states, which
rendered the possession of a license to practice law in one state
virtually irrelevant to the ability to effectively practice in another
state.25
For these reasons, states found it necessary to regulate the prac-
tice of law by out-of-state attorneys in order to protect their citi-
zens. The restrictions were intended to ensure the competency of
lawyers practicing within the state by requiring that the attorneys
be familiar with the substantive laws and procedures of the state.26
The restrictions also allowed the state to discipline the out-of-state
attorney by withdrawing his authorization to practice.27
It is the duty of every attorney who plans to practice law in an-
other state to obtain authorization by fulfilling all state require-
ments.28  The attorney whose practice of law frequently requires
him to cross state lines is met with state regulations that are often
very difficult to fulfill. Since these state requirements are often
jurisdictions would be disbarred in one without any of the others becoming aware of it.
The attorney would continue to practice in the other jurisdictions, although evidence
existed to demonstrate his lack of fitness. Id. at 156-57. The committee noted that these
problems existed because there has been no systematic procedure by which disciplinary
agencies are advised whenever attorneys are disciplined. Id. at 158.
24. Indeed, this appeared to be true as late as 1970, when the Clark Report was
issued. The committee gave numerous examples of how attorneys admitted to practice in
several jurisdictions could continue to practice despite disbarment in one jurisdiction. Id.
at 156-58. The committee noted that some state disciplinary jurisdictions even fail to
advise the federal courts sitting in the same geographical location of discipline imposed
on an attorney who is a member of both the state and federal bars. Id. at 157-58.
25. See generally Kalish, Pro Hac Vice Admission: A Proposal, 1979 S. ILL. L.J. 367,
368 (substantive law among states varies less and less).
26. See Comment, supra note 19, at 744. "Restrictions have been justified as means
to: (1) insure competency of lawyers practicing within state courts, (2) insure that the
attorneys in their courts are familiar with the substantive law and procedures of the state,
and (3) discipline attorneys by withdrawing authorization to practice." Id.
27. Id.; see also Undem v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 266 Ark. 683, 587 S.W.2d
563 (1979). In Undem, the court noted:
The prohibition against engaging in the practice of law applies to all except
those who are members of the Bar of the state of Arkansas. This is not only to
insure piofessiunal competence, but is, in the public interest, to insure that pub-
lic be not led to rely upon counseling, in matters of law, by those who are not
answerable to the courts in this state for the manner in which they meet their
professional obligations by compliance with standards of professional conduct
imposed upon those engaging in practice in state.
Id. at 689, 587 S.W.2d at 569.
28. See supra note 5. See generally Hafter, Toward The Multistate Practice of Law
Through Admission by Reciprocity, 53 Miss. L.J. 1 (1983) (present state restrictions on
admission of practicing attorneys constitute substantial barriers to multistate practice).
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very burdensome on the attorney who only wants to practice in
that state on a limited basis, some attorneys ignore the require-
ments and practice without any authorization. 29 The American
Bar Association has recognized these problems and has recom-
mended that the legal profession discourage regulation that unrea-
sonably imposes territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to
handle the legal affairs of his client.3" It has also recommended
that the legal profession discourage regulation that unreasonably
imposes territorial limitation upon the opportunity of a client to
obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice.31
DISCUSSION
Illinois' Rules On Admission For Out-Of-State Attorneys
An out-of-state attorney who wants to practice law in Illinois
can obtain authorization to do so in one of three ways. First, the
attorney can become licensed to practice in Illinois by a method
known as "qualification on examination. ' 32  In order to obtain a
license, the attorney must meet designated educational require-
ments3 3 and pass the examination administered by the Board of
29. R. BURKETT, supra note 20, at 13. According to Burkett, "The multitude of
corporate counsel practicing in jurisdictions in which they are not licensed raises serious
unauthorized practice implications (assuming the jurisdictions do not specifically allow
such practices). These highly distinguished men and women practicing law all around
the country are committing misdemeanors each day they report to work."
30. MODEL CODE EC 3-9.
[T]he demands of business and the mobility of our society pose distinct
problems in the regulation of the practice of law by the states. In furtherance of
the public interest, the legal profession should discourage regulation that unrea-
sonably imposes territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to handle the
legal affairs of his client or upon the opportunity of a client to obtain the serv-
ices of a lawyer of his choice in all matters including the presentation of a con-
tested matter in a tribunal before which the lawyer is not permanently admitted
to practice.
Id.
31. Id.
32. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 704 (Qualification on Examination) states:
(a) Any person who meets the educational requirements set forth in Rule 703
may make application to the Board of Law Examiners for admission on
examination.
(b) Application shall be in such form as the board shall prescribe and shall be
accompanied with proof that the applicant meets the requirements of Rule 701,
together with proof of his educational qualifications. In the event the proof
shall be satisfactory to the board, the applicant shall be admitted to
examination.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 704, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, 704 (1983).
33. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 703 (Educational Requirements) states:
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 16
Law Examiners.3 4
Alternatively, an attorney may obtain a license to practice law
without examination by "qualification on foreign license," but he
must fulfill certain conditions.35 The attorney must be able to meet
certain educational qualifications 36 and he must have resided and
actively and continuously practiced law in such other jurisdiction
for at least five of the seven years immediately prior to applying for
admission in Illinois.37 The attorney must also establish that he is
an actual resident of the State of Illinois and that upon admission
to the bar he will actively and continuously engage in the practice
of law in Illinois.3 s The attorney must receive from the Committee
on Character and Fitness its certificate of good moral character
and general fitness to practice law.39 "Qualification on foreign li-
Every applicant seeking admission to the bar on examination shall meet the
following educational requirements:
(a) Preliminary and College Work. Each applicant shall have graduated from a
four-year high school or other preparatory school whose graduates are admitted
on diploma to the freshman class of any college or university having admission
requirements equivalent to those of the University of Illinois, or shall have be-
come otherwise eligible for admission to such freshman class; and shall have
satisfactorily completed at least 90 semester hours of acceptable college work,
while in actual attendance at one or more colleges or universities approved by
the Board of Law Examiners ...
(b) Legal Education. . . .[E]ach applicant shall have pursued a course of
law studies and fulfilled the requirements and received a first degree in law from
a law school approved by the American Bar Association ...
ILL. SUP. Cr. R. 703, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, 703 (Supp. 1984).
34. Supreme Court Rule 701 (General Qualifications) states:
(a) Persons may be admitted to practice law in this State by the Supreme
Court if they are at least 21 years of age, of good moral character and general
fitness to practice law, and have satisfactorily completed an examination on aca-
demic qualification and, effective July 1, 1981, also have satisfactorily com-
pleted an examination on professional responsibility conducted by the Board of
Law Examiners or have been licensed to practice law in another jurisdiction
and, effective July 1, 1981, have satisfactorily completed a professional responsi-
bility examination, subject, however, to the requirements contained in these
rules.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 701, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A 701 (1983).
35. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705 (Qualification on Foreign License) states: "Any
person who has been admitted to practice in the highest court of law in any other state or
territory of the United States or the District of Columbia may make application to the
Buard of Law Examiners for admission to the bar, without academic qualification .
ILL. Sup. CT. R. 705, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, 705 (1983).
36. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705(a) states: "The educational qualifications of the
applicant are such as would entitle him to write the academic qualification examination
in this State at the time he seeks admission .... " ILL. Sup. CT. R. 705(a), ILL. REV.
STAT. ch.l 0A, 705(a) (1983). See supra note 33.
37. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 705(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, 705(a) (1983).
38. ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 705(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1b0A, 705(d) (1983).
39. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 705(e), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l1b0A, 705(e) (1983).
1985] Pro Hac Vice Model Rule Proposal
cense" is not available to any attorney who has taken and failed the
bar examination in Illinois.'
Finally, an attorney can obtain temporary authorization to prac-
tice law in Illinois by admission pro hac vice.41 Under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 707, the courts have the discretion to allow
an attorney to appear before them in the trial or argument of any
particular cause in which he is employed.4 2
Unauthorized Practice of Law in Illinois
An out-of-state attorney who does not obtain a license or admis-
sion pro hac vice is not authorized to practice law in Illinois.43
Although the legal profession has been reluctant to adopt a single,
specific definition of the practice of law," Illinois courts have
adopted one definition as being substantially correct.45 Under Illi-
nois' definition, the practice of law includes not only court appear-
ances in connection with litigation, but also services rendered out
of court, such as the giving of advice or the rendering of any serv-
ices which require the use of legal skill or knowledge. 46  Because
40. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 705(f), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, 705(0 (1983).
41. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 707 (Foreign Attorneys in Isolated Cases) states:
Anything in these rules to the contrary notwithstanding, an attorney and
counselor-at-law from any other jurisdiction in the United States, or foreign
country, may in the discretion of any court of this State be permitted to partici-
pate before the court in the trial or argument of any particular cause in which,
for the time being, he is employed.
ILL. Sup. CT. R. 707, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, 707 (1983).
42. Id.
43. See supra note 5.
44. MODEL CODE EC 3-5. EC 3-5 states:
Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others
that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence of the profes-
sional judgment of a lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general body and
philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client; and thus, the public
interest will be better served if only lawyers are permitted to act in matters
involving professional judgment ....
Id. One court commented on attempts to specifically define the practice of law as follows:
"In the light of the historical development of the lawyer's functions, it is impossible to lay
down an exhaustive definition of the practice of law by attempting to enumerate every
conceivable act performed by lawyers in the normal course of their work." State Bar of
Ariz. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 87, 366 P.2d 1, 8-9 (1961), modi-
fied, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962). "What constitutes unauthorized practice of law
in a particular jurisdiction is a matter for determination by the courts of that jurisdic-
tion." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 198 (1959).
45. Mendelsohn v. CNA Ins. Co., 115 I11. App. 3d 964, 967, 451 N.E.2d 919, 922
(1983).
46. People v. People's Stock Yards Bank, 344 11. 462, 475, 176 N.E. 901, 907 (1931).
Accord In re Bodkin, 21 11. 2d 458, 461, 173 N.E.2d 440, 441 (1961); People ex rel.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 404 Iil. 45, 50, 87 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1949); People ex
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 16
this definition can often be difficult to apply to a particular fact
situation, an out-of-state attorney must be cautious in his actions in
Illinois to avoid engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd. , is an example of an attorney's
unauthorized practice of law in Illinois. Lozoff, an attorney li-
censed in Wisconsin, but not in Illinois, was hired by Shore
Heights, an Illinois company, to draft and negotiate a contract
with another Illinois company for the purchase of real estate lo-
cated in Illinois.4" Shore Heights entered into a written agreement
with Lozoff, promising to pay attorney fees to Lozoff for the legal
services rendered in conjuction with the real estate deal.4 9 Shore
Heights failed, however, to remit the agreed-upon fees and Lozoff
sued for payment.50
Reversing the jury's verdict, the appellate court held that Lozoff
was not entitled to recover his legal fees because an attorney who is
not licensed to practice law in Illinois cannot recover on a contract
to perform legal services in Illinois.51 In response to Lozofis argu-
rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 I11. 282, 288, 77 N.E.2d 693, 696, cert. denied, 334
U.S. 833 (1948); Mendelsohn, 115 Ii1. App. 3d at 967-68, 451 N.E.2d at 922; Johnson v.
Pistakee Highlands Community Ass'n, 72 Ill. App. 3d 402, 403-04, 390 N.E.2d 640, 642
(1979).
Depending on the circumstances, the filling out of standardized forms can be consid-
ered the practice of law in Illinois. The question becomes whether the filling out of forms
requires no more than ordinary business intelligence or whether it requires legal skill or
knowledge. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 116, 122-23, 214
N.E.2d 771, 774-75 (1966). A secretary can readily fill out a form, but it often requires a
lawyer's advice to determine whether the form will accomplish a desired result. The
Quinlan court held that drafting and attending to the execution of instruments relating to
real estate titles are within the practice of law proscribed for unlicensed persons. Id. at
122-23, 214 N.E.2d at 775.
47. 35 Ill. App. 3d 697, 342 N.E.2d 475, afl'd, 66 111. 2d 398, 362 N.E.2d 1047
(1976).
48. Id. at 698, 342 N.E.2d at 477.
49. In pertinent part, this agreement provided as follows:
Dear Mr. Lozoff:
This is to serve as a memorandum of our agreement in which you will be paid
the sum of $65,000 as attorney's fees for the legal services rendered by you in
the Aldridge Construction Company-Shore Heights land agreement for proper-
ties located in Kendall County, Illinois.
50. Lozoff filed a complaint alleging that he was due $65,000 from Shore Heights,
Ltd., for having rendered legal services to them as described in the agreement. Since the
jury found that Lozoff had performed all of the services which were required by him by
the contract, they returned a verdict in Lozoffis favor and against Shore Heights in the
amount of $65,000. Shore Heights appealed and the applellate court only considered the
question of whether an attorney who is not licensed to practice law in Illinois can recover
on a contract to perform legal services in Illinois. Id. at 699, 342 N.E.2d at 477.
51. The appellate court held that Lozoff was not entitled to recover his $65,000 in
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ment that Supreme Court Rule 707 was inapposite since he was
attempting to recover for legal services performed outside the
courts,5 2 the court noted that in the absence of some extenuating
circumstances, an out-of-state attorney who renders services lo-
cally falls within the prohibition against illegally practicing law
and cannot recover compensation from his client for the local
services.-3
ANALYSIS
Old Justifications vs. Current Needs For Restricting the Interstate
Practice of Law
The steady increase in societal mobility in the past few decades
has brought about a rise in the incidences of interstate legal issues
and disputes. 4 The practices of many attorneys currently span
across the country due to the multistate business practices and
lifestyles of their clientele." The states, however, have not effec-
tively amended their regulations on the interstate practice of law to
adjust to this increase in mobility.5 6
Most of the original justifications for restricting the interstate
practice of law no longer exist. 57 An Illinois client's need for pro-
legal fees because of § 1 of the Attorneys and Counselors Act. Id. at 703, 342 N.E.2d at
480. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, 1 (1983), which states in part:
No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor at law
within this State without having previously obtained a license for that purpose
from the Supreme Court of this State.
No person shall receive any compensation directly or indirectly for any legal
services other than a regularly licensed attorney.
52. Lozoff, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 700, 342 N.E.2d at 478. See supra note 42 for the text of
Supreme Court Rule 707.
53. Id. at 701, 342 N.E.2d at 479.
54. Note, supra note 1, at 1711. The note states that "the increased mobility of the
populace has made more frequent the local practitioner's encounter with a client who has
interests in different jurisdictions."
55. Kalish, supra note 25. Kalish notes that "lawyers responding to social, economic
and political factors have in fact become more mobile. These influencing factors include
national unity, legal uniformity, professional specialization, political (e.g., social reform
and civil rights) assertiveness and solicitude for the client's choice of attorney." Id. at
367-68. Underlying all these factors are technological advances in transportation and
communication which have facilitated this mobility. Id. at 368.
56. Brakel & Loh, supra note 4, at 700. Brakel & Loh note that "resistence to the
phenomenon of increased interstate practice of law is prevalent today. A network of legal
rules and regulations is aimed at restricting the practice of out-of-state ('foreign')
lawyers."
57. R. BURKETr, supra note 20.
[T]he fundamental assumptions behind these rules are rooted in the legal and
social realities of the roaring twenties. If this premise is at least partially true, it
is safe to say that the regulation of the practice of law by the states, in so far as
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tection from incompetent out-of-state attorneys has diminished
considerably since the early 1900's. The typical client who obtains
out-of-state counsel today is not a casual consumer of legal serv-
ices, but is rather a sophisticated or specialized business or
individual.5
At present, if an Illinois client is the victim of attorney malprac-
tice, he will have the means to obtain a remedy even if his attorney
was unauthorized to practice in Illinois. In 1955, Illinois adopted a
long-arm jurisdiction statute that submits any person to the juris-
diction of Illinois courts if the person does certain enumerated
acts. 9 If a nonresident of Illinois transacts any business within
Illinois6° or commits a tortious act within Illinois,6' Illinois courts
it relates to the practice of licensed out-of-state attorneys, is inconsistent with
the needs and realities of this country in the 1980's.
Id. at 1-2; see also Brakel, supra note 1, at 1084. Brakel notes that the regulations on
interstate practice are based on historical concepts and that perhaps the nature of modem
American society makes these concepts obsolete to a point where regulations must be
abandoned and exceptions must be made to the rules.
58. R. BURKETr, supra note 20, at 5.
59. Section 2-209 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby
submits such person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from
the doing of any such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(b) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may be made by personally
serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in this
Act, with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally
served within this State.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-209 (1982); see infra note 120.
60. E.g., Biltmoor Moving & Storage Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F.2d 202 (7th Cir.
1979). The court noted that under Illinois law, despite lack of physical presence within
Illinois, the long-arm statute and notions of due process permit Illinois courts to gain
jurisdiction over a person or corporation who enters a contract knowing that it will be
performed in Illinois. Id. at 207; see also Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 461 F.2d
897 (7th Cir. 1972). There the court held that three meetings in Chicago between repre-
sentatives of the plaintiff Connecticut Cornoration and the manavino director ad Sales-
man of the defendant English corporation were sufficiently meaningful to fulfill due
process requirements and that the defendant was "transacting business" within the mean-
ing of Illinois' long-arm statute so that the federal district court in Illinois acquired per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 900.
61. E.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir.
1975) (term "tortious act," under Illinois long-arm statute, includes concept of injury and
situs of tort is place where injury occurs); Dodine's, Inc. v. Sonny-O, Inc., 494 F. Supp.
1279 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (for purposes of Illinois long-arm statute, jurisdiction is obtained
regardless of whether tortious conduct caused economic or physical injury).
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have personal jurisdiction over that nonresident. Since Illinois citi-
zens can derive substantial protection from the long-arm jurisdic-
tion statute,62 the Illinois rules on admission of out-of-state
attorneys can become less restrictive without reducing protection
of Illinois citizens.
The fact that an attorney obtained his license to practice law in
another state will not typically be the most important factor in de-
termining whether he is competent to practice law in Illinois today.
State admission standards are now much more similar than they
were in the past.63 Almost every state requires an undergraduate
degree plus graduation from an organized law school.' As of
1983, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have required
all new applicants to pass a written bar examination. 65  Testing
standards for the bar examination have become increasingly uni-
form with the widespread use of the Multistate Bar Examination,
now adopted by forty-six states and the District of Columbia.66
62. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that a person submits to the jurisdiction
of Illinois courts if he has invoked the benefits and protections of the law of Illinois. Gray
v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 440, 176 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1961).
Although the Illinois long-arm statute has not yet been used by an Illinois client
against an out-of-state attorney, an out-of-state attorney who comes into Illinois to prac-
tice law submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois because he has invoked the
benefits and protections of the law of Illinois. See Tabor & Co. v. McNall, 30 Ill. App. 3d
593, 333 N.E.2d 562 (1975). In Tabor, contracts for purchase and delivery of grain were
negotiated in phone calls between parties in Wisconsin and Illinois. Confirmation was
sent from Illinois to Wisconsin and the delivery of grain was to occur in Illinois. Id. at
595, 333 N.E.2d at 563. The court held that the sellers performed acts sufficient to con-
stitute transaction of business within Illinois so as to give the court personal jurisdiction
over them in Illinois in an Illinois action brought by buyer for breach of contract. Id.; see
also State Security Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 530 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
There, exercise of jurisdiction over a Texas law firm under the Illinois long-arm statute
was precluded when the law firm only mailed into Illinois a false letter and check which
caused injury to occur in Illinois to an Illinois plaintiff. The court held that the law firm
had taken no action to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within Illinois. Id. at 99-100.
63. Hafter, supra note 28, at 7-9. "Thus, there is little difference in the educational
requirements for initial admission among American jurisdictions. There are also minor
differences among the states over bar examination requirements." Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 7 n.22. In 1950, thirty-five states permitted law office study as preparation
for admission to the bar. Today there are only four states, California, Mississippi, Ver-
mont, and Virginia, in which attorneys can prepare for the bar examination by law office
study. Id.
65. Id. at 8 n.25. "As of 1983, only one state, Wisconsin, continues to admit gradu-
ates of in-state law schools without any additional examination of their legal knowledge."
Id.
66. Id. at 8 n.26. Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, and Washington are the only states not
using the Multistate Bar Examination as part of their bar examination. Id. Some dispari-
ties still exist in the standard of proficiency required to pass the bar examination in differ-
ent jurisdictions. Id. at 9.
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State bar examinations will continue to become more similar be-
cause state substantive and procedural laws are becoming much
more uniform in nature.67
The fact that the original justifications for restricting the inter-
state practice of law are no longer compelling does not mean the
State of Illinois has absolutely no interest in protecting Illinois citi-
zens from incompetent out-of-state attorneys. It does mean, how-
ever, that the state's interest in protection of its citizens is
substantially less than it was in the early 1900's. Consequently,
Illinois should amend its restrictions to meet the needs of our mo-
bile society without leaving Illinois citizens unprotected.
Impact of the Illinois Rules on Admission of Out-Of-State
Attorneys
Although the Illinois rules on admission of out-of-state attorneys
to practice in Illinois are constitutional,68 the rules should be
amended to accommodate the realities of modern society. There
are three basic problems with the rules as they currently exist.
First, they restrict an Illinois client's right to counsel by not al-
lowing him to obtain an out-of-state attorney for matters to be han-
dled out of court. Second, the Illinois rules are difficult to enforce.
Finally, the rules often put an out-of-state attorney in a difficult
and unfair position because they do not sufficiently explain what
type of out-of-court actions constitute the unauthorized practice of
law in Illinois.
Restriction on Clients' Right to Counsel
There are many circumstances under which an Illinois citizen
might prefer to obtain out-of-state counsel. 69 The need for profes-
sional specialization increases as society continues to become more
67. See Kalish, supra note 25, at 368 (legal uniformity is a fact of modern life); Haf-
ter, supra note 28, at 9-10. Hafter noted that since there has been a trend toward uni-
formity of substantive and procedural law, there remain relatively few topics involving
local practice requirements which can be used to justify an additional examination. Id. at
9. Hafter also pointed out that because a formal examination is an unnecessary and bur-
densome requirement to experienced attorneys, no provision for reexamination has been
1111.1 u15I iIUiLI 'uor a Uniform Standard for Admission b ciroc
under consideration by the American Bar Association. Id. at 10.
68. See Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974)
(Illinois bar examination upheld as being constitutional); Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 521 F.
Supp. 534 (N.D. Il. 1981) (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705(a)(1) found to be constitu-
tional); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill. 1975) (Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 707 governing foreign attorneys is, in isolated cases, constitutional
as applied in limiting participation of out-of-state attorneys in pending state legislation).
69. See E. MICHELMAN, PRO HAC VICE REGULATION - IN THE NATIONAL INTER-
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complex. 70 Because attorneys' practices are becoming increasingly
specialized, 7' an Illinois client might want to obtain an out-of-state
attorney because he specializes in a certain area of the law.72
An attorney-client relationship is an important relationship in-
volving trust and confidentiality 73 and can last for many years.
Consequently, it is very likely that many clients moving to Illinois
would prefer to retain their out-of-state attorneys. 74 It is also pos-
sible that an Illinois client might want to obtain out-of-state coun-
sel because the attorney is an old friend or family member.75
One of the most important situations in which an Illinois client
might wish to obtain an out-of-state attorney is when the client is a
multistate business located in Illinois which wants to use its attor-
neys from its out-of-state headquarters.7 6  It is burdensome to re-
EST? 31 (The Monograph Series, Problems in Professional Responsibility, American Bar
Association Center for Professional Responsibility 1984).
70. E.g., Spanos v. Skouras Theatre Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir.) (we are in an
age of increased specialization), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966); Brakel, supra note 1, at
1084 (multistate practice problems and the increase in the complexity of our society have
led to pressures for legal uniformity and specialization); Smith, supra note 11, at 558
(today, specialization is required for an attorney to be proficient).
71. ABA LawPoll, Specialization, Relicensing, Reciprocity. What Do Lawyers Think?,
63 A.B.A. J. 1705 (1977) (forty percent of the lawyers questioned by LawPoll called
themselves specialists, and another six percent said they engaged in both general practice
and a specialty); Smith, supra note 11, at 559. Smith, a former president of the American
Bar Association, noted that those lawyers who have developed specialized skill and ex-
pertise are most likely to wish to expand their practices beyond that justified by the
purely local demand. 1d.; see also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON SPECIALI-
ZATION, LEGAL SPECIALIZATION (Specialization Monograph No. 2, 1976) (several states
have taken giant steps toward formal specialization programs).
72. See Bar Group Proposes Specialist Tags to Help Clients, Chi. Tribune, Nov. 12,
1977, at 2, col. 1 (committee of the Illinois State Bar Association drafted a proposal for a
state commission and state specialty boards to certify that lawyers are experts in different
areas of the law to help consumers find the proper lawyers to handle their legal
problems); R. BURKETT, supra note 20, at 4 (litigation against the makers of the Dalkon
Shield IUD devices is a good example of when a client might need to get an out-of-state
attorney with specialized skill.)
73. MODEL CODE Canon 4. "Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer
and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the
lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him."
MODEL CODE EC 4-1; see also MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information),
Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest), Rule 2.1 (Advisor).
74. Note, Easing Multistate Practice Restrictions- "Good Cause" Based Limited Ad-
mission, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1182, 1186-87 (1976).
75. Id. at 1187 n. 13 (noting possibility of obtaining legal services at lower cost where
the client's choice of out-of-state counsel is a personal friend); see also Brakel & Loh,
supra note 4, at 730 ("Restrictive practice regulations are especially significant to attor-
neys employed by multistate business firms as house counsel.")
76. Kalish, supra note 25, at 368. Kalish notes:
Business and economic enterprises are frequently interstate in scope, and, corre-
spondingly, legal work is equally national. Corporate counsel regularly travel
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quire a business to hire a separate attorney from each state into
which its activities venture, rather than to send attorneys from its
main office to Illinois to represent the company.77 The admission
rules also make it difficult for an out-of-state company to send its
attorneys into Illinois to negotiate a contract with an Illinois busi-
ness, or to explore the possibility of expanding into Illinois."8 In
each of these situations, the client may be unable to employ out-of-
state counsel and his right to counsel will accordingly be re-
stricted.7 9 This happens because Illinois does not provide a reason-
able method for an out-of-state attorney to obtain authorization to
practice law in Illinois on a limited basis when the attorney does
not plan to appear before a court."0
Pro hac vice is not really an alternative for the out-of-state attor-
ney who comes to Illinois to negotiate a settlement or contract.
Pro hac vice only allows a court, in its discretion,8 1 to permit an
out-of-state attorney to participate before the court in the trial or
argument of any particular case in which he is employed.8 2 A
court does not therefore have the power to authorize an out-of-
from state to state doing legal work for their clients. As a practical matter, it
would be absurd to require a business enterprise to forego the services of its
regular counsel, familiar with its operations, every time the company had busi-
ness in another state. Corresponding to the interstate nature of much modem
business, law firms too have become multistate enterprises. A law firm will
regularly have offices in several states; this permits the firm to better represent
its multistate clients. A too strict adherence to a parochial regulatory scheme
would seriously cripple the effectiveness of these firms.
Id.
77. Id.
78. See Smith, supra note 11. This author noted that "it is in the national interest
and the interest of nationwide consumers of legal services that restrictive practices and
state barriers be eliminated and interstate reciprocity be broadened." Id. at 559. See also
Special Project, Admission to the Bar: A Constitutional Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 655
(1981). The article noted that "the cost or availability of competent legal counsel may
preclude a corporation from entering into new business areas, merging with other busi-
nesses, or taking advantage of the most beneficial tax structures." Id. at 749.
79. Special Project, supra note 78, at 750. (constraints on legal services affect con-
sumers); E. MICHELMAN, supra note 69. Michelman noted that an adverse effect on
interstate commerce is "created by state restrictions on the supply of legal services in-
creasing the cost and reducing the availability of such services and influencing the price
nf relatpd biisinQ a, Men id spri p. " hd n
80. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Beatty,. 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill. 1975). The
court held that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional as applied to not allowing
out-of-state attorneys to participate in a case even though the attorneys had been permit-
ted to appear without limitation numerous times in the past, that the case was already
being prepared for trial, that the attorneys were specialists who regularly represented
their client, and that the accidents involved occurred in another state. Id. at 237.
82. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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state attorney to practice law in Illinois with regard to a matter
that is not before it.83 A court cannot authorize, through pro hac
vice, a substantial amount of the work done by out-of-state attor-
neys in Illinois.
As a result, the only way the out-of-state attorney can become
authorized to negotiate a contract or settlement in Illinois is by
obtaining a license to practice law in Illinois. 84 The restrictions
placed upon the only two available methods, "qualification on ex-
amination""s and "qualification on foreign license,"'8 6 however,
render this an unrealistic option for the majority of out-of-state
attorneys. "Qualification by examination" is a very time-consum-
ing and expensive method. The attorney must pass separate exami-
nations on academic qualification and professional responsibility."7
Generally, only two academic qualification examinations and three
professional responsibility examinations are conducted annually.8,
It would be extremely difficult for an out-of-state attorney to ac-
cept an Illinois case when he might have to wait for six months
before knowing if he is authorized to practice in Illinois. More-
over, the necessity of sitting for the entire academic examination is
an unrealistic requirement in many situations. 89  For example,
there is no need for an attorney who is a specialist in antitrust and
wants to come into Illinois solely to negotiate a settlement to be
required to pass an examination that may cover criminal law and
procedure, commercial paper or evidence. 9°
In general, when an attorney is licensed to practice law in Illi-
83. E.g., Lozoff, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 700, 342 N.E.2d at 478; see Note, Multistate Prac-
tice, supra note 74, at 1212 (pro hac vice does not provide authorization for nonlitigation
activity).
84. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
87. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 704(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, 704(c) (1983).
88. Id.
89. Smith, supra note 11, at 558. Smith noted that the more specialized a lawyer is in
one branch of the law, the greater the lawyer's difficulty will be in gaining admission
through a general bar examination. Id.
90. Supreme Court Rule 704(d) states:
The academic qualification examination shall be conducted under the super-
vision of the board, by uniform printed questions, and may be upon the follow-
ing subjects: administrative law; agency; business organizations; commercial
paper; conflict of laws; contracts; criminal law and procedure; domestic rela-
tions; equity jurisprudence, including trusts and mortgages; evidence; Federal
and State constitutional law; Federal jurisdiction and procedure; Federal taxa-
tion; Illinois procedure; personal property, including sales and bailments; real
property; suretyship; torts; and wills and administration of estates.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 704(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, 704(d) (1983).
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nois, it means that he is competent to practice in any area of the
law.9' When an out-of-state attorney wants to practice law in Illi-
nois on a full-time basis, the Illinois Supreme Court is fully justi-
fied in testing the out-of-state attorney on every area of the law
before granting him a license to practice law in Illinois. To require
an out-of-state attorney to become licensed through academic ex-
amination in order to negotiate one settlement is, however, unnec-
essary and overburdensome.
The out-of-state attorney can also obtain a license to practice
law in Illinois by "qualification on foreign license." 92 This alterna-
tive is also very impractical for the out-of-state attorney who wants
to practice in Illinois on a very limited basis. Among other re-
quirements, the attorney is required to establish that he is an actual
resident of the State of Illinois and that upon admission to the bar,
he will actively and continuously engage in the practice of law in
Illinois.93 This requirement alone will effectively stop almost any
out-of-state attorney who only wants to practice law in Illinois on a
limited basis from trying to obtain a license by "qualification on
foreign license." The Illinois rules also state that in the event the
out-of-state attorney's home state has higher qualifications for ad-
mission than Illinois, the out-of-state attorney will be required to
conform to those higher qualifications in his application for admis-
sion to the Illinois bar.94 If an out-of-state attorney's home state
does not grant reciprocal admission to attorneys licensed in Illi-
nois, then an out-of-state attorney will not be able to obtain an
Illinois license by "qualification on foreign license." '95 Because out-
91. "Any person admitted to practice law in this state is privileged to practice in
every court in Illinois." ILL. SUP. CT. R. 701, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, 701 (1983).
See In re Rosenberg, 413 Ill. 567, 576, 110 N.E.2d 186, 191 (1953) (a license to practice is
a guaranty that the person holding license is a fit person to assume the responsibility of
keeping the confidence of others while aiding and assisting them in their legal and busi-
ness affairs).
92. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 37.
94. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 705(b), ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 1 10A, 705(b) (1983).
95. See supra note 94. One of the main justifications supporting the Illinois Rules on
Admission is economic protection of the local bar. Supreme Court Rule 705(b) is an
example of thc .. ,'o protection of loca! attr..eys withnut regard, to individual comne-
tence of the out-of-state attorney. Illinois would be more assured of having competent
attorneys practicing in its courts if Illinois focused on the initial admission standards of
the out-of-state attorney's home state rather than focusing on the state's reciprocity pro-
gram. Comment, Commerce Clause Challenge, supra note 19, at 759; Note, Multistate
Practice, supra note 74, at 1197-98 ("A requirement that the applicant's home state ex-
tend a corresponding privilege ... adds nothing to the protection of the admitting state's
citizens and serves only to preserve the economic status of the local bar.").
Supreme Court Rule 705(d) further exemplifies that economic protection of the local
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of-state attorneys will be discouraged to try to obtain a license, an
Illinois citizen's chance of obtaining an out-of-state attorney is se-
verely limited.
Unenforceability
The second problem with the Illinois rules on admission of out-
of-state attorneys is that they are often difficult to enforce. 96 When
an out-of-state attorney is practicing out of court there is a very
small chance that he will be reported for the unauthorized practice
of law.97 Even if an out-of-state attorney is reported to the Illinois
bar is a justification for the Illinois Rules on Admission. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 705(d), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, 705(d) (1983). An out-of-state attorney who establishes that he
is an actual resident of Illinois and that upon admission to the bar he will actively and
continuously engage in the practice of law in Illinois is not tested on his knowledge of
substantive and procedural Illinois law. One possible rationale for this rule is that by
moving into Illinois the out-of-state attorney will learn about local customs and become
part of the community. As a result, the out-of-state attorney will learn Illinois substan-
tive and procedural law on his own. Although this rationale might prove true in the long
run, economic protection of the local bar is more likely to be the main justification for
this rule. Once the out-of-state attorney becomes an Illinois resident the state is less
concerned about the possibility of attorney fees leaving the state. See Brakel & Loh,
supra note 4, at 734-35. ("economic protection of the local bar cannot be recognized as a
valid motive for restrictions on multistate practice"); Comment, supra note 19, at 756
("The state protects the local market by excluding out-of-state competition unless that
competition will join the local market."); Note, supra note 1, at 1712 (economic protec-
tion of the local bar is an unworthy goal of state regulation according to most commenta-
tors). The economic rationale should not fall within the permissible state interests
allowed under Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), because it has
no relation to fitness or capacity to practice law. See supra note 15 for a discussion of
Schware.
96. R. BURKETr, supra note 20, at 6. "One of the greatest dangers in promoting and
enforcing the rules of professional conduct is that certain rules are so constructed as to be
difficult to enforce and, consequently, encourage non-compliance." Id. "The greatest
enforcement problem, and perhaps the single most important flaw in regulating pro hac
vice admissions, is that the rules are usually written so that they are applicable only to
court appearances. There are no special rules that apply to practice in out-of-state mat-
ters that are not yet in or may never be in litigation." Id.; see also Brakel & Loh, supra
note 4. According to these commentators:
A fundamental aspect of multistate practice regulation is its format as a flat
prohibition against such practice with only limited exceptions - admission
under certain circumstances when applicants meet defined requirements. In ad-
dition to such explicit exceptions, however, there exists a large gray area, a no-
man's land of unenforced or unenforceable proscriptions on professional activ-
ity.
Needless to say, this area of nonregulation poses some difficult questions for
those who hope to find logic and reason in the rules, and for lawyers who hope
to find instruction as to what they may or may not do. Contradiction abounds
in this no-man's land, and, not suprisingly, the legitimate concerns of assuring
ethics and competence are all but lost in the chaos that has ensued.
Id. at 715.
97. Since the Illinois client hired the out-of-state attorney, there is no reason for the
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Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission for the unau-
thorized practice of law, the commission is limited in its ability to
respond because out-of-state attorneys are not registered as officers
of the court in Illinois.98 As a result, the out-of-state attorney is
not subject to any disciplinary action in Illinois, unless he is admit-
ted pro hac vice.99 The commission refers complaints against at-
torneys unauthorized to practice in Illinois to the state's attorney's
office. The state's attorney can seek an injunction,"° an unauthor-
ized practice of law violation,' 0 or a contempt of court viola-
tion.10 2 However, the state's attorney's office typically seeks only
an injunction against an unauthorized out-of-state attorney. 103
Only in rare circumstances does it find the need to seek a contempt
of court conviction or an unauthorized practice of law convic-
tion.104 In those rare cases, a contempt of court conviction is usu-
ally sought, in preference to an unauthorized practice of law
conviction, because the state has an easier burden of proof and the
penalty is harsher for a contempt of court violation.105
Regardless of how the state's attorney's office decides to prose-
cute the unauthorized out-of-state attorney, there is no formal pro-
vision for reporting the conviction back to the attorney's home
state. ' 6 The convicted attorney remains able to practice law in
any state, other than Illinois, since it is often unlikely that an unau-
thorized out-of-state attorney will be reported to his home state.
Because the consequences of an unauthorized practice of law con-
client to report him unless the attorney was inadequate. If the attorney was inadequate,
the client would be more likely to fire the attorney or sue him for malpractice than to
report him for practicing law without authorization.
98. A state court has no jurisdiction to discipline a lawyer not licensed to practice in
that state. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
99. Koden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1977) (any
court or administrative agency which has the power to admit attorneys to practice has
the authority to disbar or discipline attorneys for unprofessional conduct); Harceg v.
Brown, 512 F. Supp. 788, 790 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (court has the inherent authority to regu-
late the conduct of the members of the bar who have occasion to practice before it); In re
JaFree, 93 Ill. 2d 450, 456, 444 N.E.2d 143, 147 (1983) (state supreme court has inherent
power to discipline attorneys admitted to practice before it).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, 1 (1983).
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38. 32-5 (1983). "A person who falsely represents himself
to be an attorney authorized to practice ... commits a Class B misdemeanor."
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, 1 (1983).
103. Telephone interview with Ms. Shoenberger, Supervisor of the Consumer Fraud
Division of the Illinois State's Attorney's Office (March 28, 1985).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Telephone interview with Mr. James Grogan, Senior Counsel of the Illinois At-
torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (March 22, 1985).
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viction are often less than severe, noncompliance with the admis-
sion rules is not discouraged.
Hardship on Attorneys
The third problem with the current Illinois rules on admission is
that an out-of-state attorney is put in a difficult situation because
he must be able to determine in advance when his actions in Illi-
nois require authorization."°7 For example, the out-of-state attor-
ney must try to determine whether all the preparation and drafting
prior to the actual court filing of a lawsuit is unauthorized practice
of the law. 0 8 The out-of-state attorney must also try to determine
whether his giving of legal advice to an Illinois client on Illinois
law will result in the attorney's submission to the jurisdiction of
the Illinois courts. 10 9 The out-of-state attorney who practices law
in Illinois in any way does so at great risk because the rules are
107. R. BURKETT, supra note 20, at 16. Burkett notes that "Attorneys who enter
into even the most basic forms of interstate practice do so at great risk, with few guide-
lines and no logical unity of approach from jurisdiction to jurisdiction." Id.; E.
MICHELMAN, supra note 69, at 12. Michelman notes that "lawyers should probably be
considered the victims rather than the villains of these interweaving networks of regula-
tory authority and rules. From the point of view of the interstate practitioner as well as
the client he serves it would be valuable to receive consistent messages of when his con-
duct requires specific authorization through a court. . . . In most cases, the burden falls
on the individual lawyer to determine in advance when a legal matter has become so
inextricably intertwined with the laws or legal system of another jurisdiction that some
official acknowledgement of their involvement is desirable to prevent any risk of prosecu-
tion for unauthorized practice." Id.
108. Kalish, supra note 25, at 374.
An unlicensed lay person may not practice law in a state, but a foreign attor-
ney, once granted pro hac vice admission status, may litigate a cause. Before
such permission or without such permission, the foreign attorney is unauthor-
ized to practice. This scheme probably deters foreign attorneys from engaging
in litigation preparation for if the preparation is considered the practice of law,
the foreign attorney may not only be unable to collect a fee, but he may be
considered to have engaged in criminal activity. The foreign attorney's uncer-
tainty about when law practice will be permitted will be further aggravated by
the ambiguities and difficulties associated with the meaning of the concept of
the unauthorized practice of law. The consequences of this uncertainty and its
probable deterrent effect on foreign attorney preparatory work are unfortunate
for frequently trial preparation can be the most important stage of a case. It
may actually lead to the avoidance of litigation, either by way of settlement or
by a decision not to file suit.
Id.
109. For example, whether an out-of-state attorney will have submitted to the juris-
diction of the Illinois courts by giving advice over the telephone to an Illinois client about
Illinois law will probably depend on whether the attorney has invoked the benefits and
protections of the law of Illinois. State Security Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall and Co., 530 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See supra note 62 for a discussion of the State Security case.
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ambiguous as to what constitutes the practice of law. I"o Rules that
are ambiguous and very hard to enforce generally tend to en-
courage noncompliance. 11
Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 1 2 shows how the Illinois rules can
be unfair to an out-of-state attorney. The Illinois rules did not pro-
vide Lozoff with a practical way to obtain authorization to negoti-
ate a land agreement in Illinois. 113  Although Lozoff was a
competent attorney who performed all of the services required of
him by the contract, he was not allowed to collect his legal fees."l 4
Even if the out-of-state attorney determines that his actions consti-
tute the practice of law in Illinois, he might still find it unfeasible to
try to obtain authorization given the difficulties inherent in the ad-
mission rules.' '5
ALTERNATIVE
An Expanded and Improved Pro Hac Vice Proposal
Illinois should set up a procedure that encourages out-of-state
attorneys to become authorized to practice in Illinois."I6 The pro-
cedure should consist of two different parts. Illinois should first
provide a practical way for an out-of-state attorney to become au-
thorized to practice law in Illinois on a limited basis. The state
should then enforce this procedure by disciplining any attorney
who enters Illinois and practices law in any manner without
authorization.
One possible way for Illinois to establish a practical method for
authorizing an out-of-state attorney to practice is by expanding
110. The Illinois pro hac vice statute does not state whether all the preparation, ad-
vice and drafting prior to the actual court filing is unauthorized practice. See supra note
41.
111. See supra note 107.
112. 35 Ill. App. 3d 697, 342 N.E.2d 475, aifid, 66 Ill. 2d 398, 362 N.E.2d 1047
(1976).
113. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 51. Lozoff was competent enough to obtain a license to practice
law in Illinois only eight months after he had entered in the contract with Shore Heights.
35 ii. App. 3d at 69, 342 N.E.2d at 477.
115. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
116. See Smith, supra note 11, at 559.
It is in the national interest and the interest of nationwide consumers of legal
services that restrictive practices and state barriers be eliminated and interstate
reciprocity be broadened. Although the lawyers in one state may benefit tempo-
rarily from shutting out others, the legal profession in the long run must find its
economic prosperity in national union, not in state division.
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and improving the pro hac vice device. 1 7 Pro hac vice should be
expanded by giving courts the power to authorize an out-of-state
attorney's practice of law that is not before a court. In order for an
out-of-state attorney to obtain authorization to practice any type of
law in Illinois on a limited basis, he should have to petition a court
or an administrative agency for authorization.'" 8 Three independ-
ent requirements should be fulfilled by every out-of-state attorney
before a court can authorize an attorney to practice law in Illinois
on a limited basis. Before these requirements could be addressed,
however, it would have to be demonstrated that the attorney's
home state accorded Illinois attorneys a similar privilege to prac-
tice in that state. While such a prerequisite is undesirable from a
theoretical point of view, as a practical matter it will probably be
necessary for acceptance of the expanded pro hac vice device.
The first requirement is for the attorney to submit to the state's
disciplinary and malpractice jurisdiction. "9 It is very important
for the state to obtain disciplinary jurisdiction 120 over all attorneys
who practice law in Illinois in and out of court because the state's
117. This new procedure goes beyond just providing a method for out-of-state attor-
neys to obtain authorization to practice law out of court in Illinois on a limited basis.
This procedure would apply to all out-of-state attorneys who want to practice law in
Illinois on a limited basis, whether in or out of court. As a result, the procedure would
replace Supreme Court Rule 707. See supra note 41 for a discussion of this rule.
118. The out-of-state attorney would petition a court if he plans to file the case in the
court. If the out-of-state attorney planned to practice law out of court, then he would
have to petition an agency designated by the Illinois Supreme Court, possibly the Attor-
ney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
119. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, app. (R. Governing Admission to Bar XIV)
(1975) ("A nonresident lawyer will not be permitted to engage in any case in an Arkansas
court unless he first signs a written statement, to be filed with the court, in which the
nonresident lawyer submits himself to all disciplinary procedures applicable to Arkansas
lawyers."); E. MICHELMAN, supra note 69, at 6 ("Most regulations explicitly state that
the pro hac vice applicant must submit to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the forum state
120. Long-arm jurisdiction and disciplinary jurisdiction are two different concepts.
Long-arm statutes provide for personal jurisdiction and service of process over persons or
corporations who are nonresidents of the state and voluntarily go into the state, directly
or by agent, or communicate with persons in the state, for limited purposes, in actions
which concern claims relating to the performance or execution of those purposes.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (5th ed. 1983). Disciplinary jurisdiction is the state's
ability to impose a sanction on an attorney for misconduct. A state obtains this jurisdic-
tion when the state admits a lawyer to practice in the state. If a lawyer is practicing in a
state in which he is not admitted, the state does not have disciplinary jurisdiction,
although the lawyer may still be prosecuted by that state for unauthorized practice (crim-
inal charges). See PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES, STANDARD
4.1 (1979) ("A lawyer admitted to practice in a state should be subject to the jurisdiction
of its agency."); 4.2 ("All lawyers specially admitted to practice in a state for a limited
purpose should be subject to the jurisdiction of the agency in the state with respect to any
misconduct related to that purpose."); see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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ability to enforce the admission rules would be greatly enhanced.
Upon receipt of a formal complaint, the state would hold a hearing
to determine whether the out-of-state attorney was guilty of mal-
practice.' 2' If the attorney were found guilty, the court would have
the authority to permanently prohibit the attorney from practicing
in Illinois, to suspend his authorization to practice in Illinois, or to
impose a reprimand on the attorney.1 22 Illinois would then send a
certified copy of the findings of fact to the out-of-state attorney's
home state. 23 Upon receipt of the reprimand and findings of fact,
many states through reciprocal agreements could initiate a discipli-
nary proceeding against the attorney and hold that the certified
copy of the findings of fact constitutes conclusive evidence that the
attorney committed misconduct.
24
121. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, 753 (1983) (Inquiry, Hearing
and Review Boards); PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES, STAN-
DARD 8.1 (1979) ("A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated by counsel upon the com-
plaint of another person or entity, or upon counsel's own motion in light of information
received or acquired from any source.").
122. Supreme Court Rule 771 (Types of Discipline) states:
Conduct of attorneys which violates the Code of Professional Responsibility
contained in article VIII of these rules or which tends to defeat the administra-
tion of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute shall
be grounds for discipline by the court. Discipline of attorneys may be:
(a) disbarment;
(b) disbarment on consent;
(c) suspension for a specified period and until further order of court;
(d) suspension for a specified period of time;
(e) suspension until further order of the court;
(f) suspension for a specified period of time or until further order of the court
with probation; or
(g) censure.
ILL. Sup. CT. R. 771, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. II OA, $ 771 (1983); see also PROFESSIONAL
DISCIPLINE FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES, STANDARD 6 (1979) (court has the power to
impose various sanctions: disbarment, suspension, probation, reprimand, admonition,
restitution.) The court would determine the length of the suspension by considering the
severity of the misconduct. After the attorney's suspension had expired, the court could
require association with local counsel before the court would again grant admission pro
hac vice.
123. See infra note 137.
124. In the following cases, the courts have recognized that findings made in connec-
tion with an order disbarring or suspending an attorney in one state were entitled to
preclusive effect in subsequent disciplinary proceedings against the attorney in a different
state. Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So.2d 193 (1965), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983 (1967).
The Wilkes court concluded that a rule of the Florida bar made a New York judgment of
guilt conclusive proof of an attorney's misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding in Florida.
Id. at 197; Nolan v. Brawley, 251 Ind. 697, 244 N.E.2d 918 (1969). After discovering
that an Indiana attorney was disbarred in Wisconsin, the Nolan court concluded that to
uphold the integrity of the Indiana State Bar, as well as to protect the citizens of Indiana
from such persons, the attorney should not be allowed to honorably occupy a position of
trust and confidence in Indiana when he was unable to do so in Wisconsin, and that he
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The second requirement would be that the attorney establish
that he is competent to practice law.'25 Besides meeting educa-
tional qualifications, 26 the attorney would have to show that he
has a satisfactory disciplinary record. 127 The attorney should not
would therefore be disbarred from practice in Indiana. Id. at 702-04, 224 N.E.2d at 922-
23; Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Sturek, 209
N.W.2d 899 (Iowa 1973). The Sturek court stated that the attorney had been charged
with violation of Nebraska canons of professional ethics which, like Iowa's, were based
on the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. It also noted that
after the conclusion of Nebraska disciplinary proceedings, the Nebraska Supreme Court
had found the attorney guilty of gross professional misconduct and had ordered his dis-
barment and that this adjudication of misconduct was entitled to full faith and credit in
Iowa. Id.; Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Signer, 533 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1976). The Signer court
stated that in the absence of some defense sufficient to support a collateral attack, the
facts adjudicated in a sister state, on which its disciplinary judgment against an attorney
was based, should be treated as conclusively established, so as to eliminate any necessity
of retrying, in a disciplinary proceeding in Kentucky, the same factual issues or other
factual issues which could and should have been raised in the sister state's proceedings.
Id. at 537; see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 763, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, 763 (1973) ("Re-
ciprocal Disciplinary Action"); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 31 (1984). Thirty-two states have rules that provide that a certified
copy of the findings of fact in a disciplinary proceeding in another jurisdiction constitute
conclusive evidence that the respondent committed the misconduct and that the only
issues to be decided in the reciprocal proceeding will be whether the respondent was
afforded due process of law in the course of the original proceeding and whether the
imposition of identical discipline in the forum state would be clearly inappropriate. Id.;
81 A.L.R. 3d 1281 (discussing disbarment or suspension of attorney in one state as affect-
ing right to continue practice in another state).
125. See MODEL CODE DR 6-101. Ethical Consideration 6-3 states:
[A] lawyer generally should not accept employment in any area of the law in
which he is not qualified. However, he may accept such employment if in good
faith he expects to become qualified through study and investigation, as long as
such preparation would not result in unreasonable delay or expense to his cli-
ent. Proper preparation and representation may require the association by the
lawyer of professionals in other disciplines. A lawyer offered employment in a
matter which he is not and does not expect to become so qualified should either
decline the employment or, with the consent of his client, accept the employ-
ment and associate a lawyer who is competent in the matter." MODEL CODE
EC 6-3.
126. The out-of-state attorney would still have to fulfill the educational requirement
as set out in Supreme Court Rule 703. See supra note 33.
127. Each application would be required to be supported by a certificate of a judge of
a court of general jurisdiction in the jurisdiction from which the applicant seeks admis-
sion certifying that the applicant has been admitted to and, at the time of making said
application, is a member in good standing of the bar of that jurisdiction. The applicant
must have successfully passed the Illinois professional responsibility examination or, in
the alternative, the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the board that he or she has
written and scored a passing grade in the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exami-
nation of the National Conference of Bar Examiners within five years prior to the appli-
cation. Both of these requirements are currently in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705.
ILL..SUP. CT. R. 705, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, 705 (1983).
The current pro hac vice rules do not require any proof of a satisfactory disciplinary
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have to provide proof that he has resided and actively and continu-
ously practiced law in such other jurisdiction for a period of at
least five years of the seven years immediately prior to petitioning
the court.'28
The third requirement would be that the attorney explain to the
court the intended scope of his practice of law in Illinois. Unless
the case involves complex legal issues in which Illinois law is sub-
stantially different than the law of the attorney's home state, the
court should grant the out-of-state attorney's petition. 129 If the
case does involve complex legal issues or procedures, the court
would then review the attorney's petition in an effort to determine
whether, and to what extent,1 30 the court should require associa-
record. See supra note 41. Although some courts do require a local attorney to file a
motion for a pro hac vice admission of a foreign attorney in order for that court to allow
a foreign attorney to appear before it, Supreme Court Rule 707 does not mandate this
requirement. Id. Even where a local attorney is required, the local attorney has no af-
firmative duty to investigate the credentials of the foreign attorney. Cruzat v. Board of
Trustees, 126 Ill. App. 3d 717, 720, 467 N.E.2d 975, 978 (1984).
128. See supra note 37. One justification for this requirement is that it ensures that
an out-of-state attorney has been under the watchful eye of a state's disciplinary agency
for a substantial amount of time. The rationale behind such a requirement is that an
attorney who fulfills this requirement and is currently in good standing is more likely to
be competent than an attorney who has not been practicing law in one area for a substan-
tial amount of time. See, e.g., Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983). The
Lowrie court held that the Illinois Supreme Court rule which permits admission of for-
eign-licensed attorneys into the state bar of Illinois without examination, provided the
applicant has resided and actively practiced law in the licensing state for a period of at
least five out of the immediately preceding seven years, had a rational basis of concern for
a bar applicant's character and fitness, and thus did not violate the equal protection
clause. Id. at 409-10. But see Brakel & Loh, supra note 4, at 710 (prior practice period in
another state is an unnecessary burden on foreign applicants); Comment, supra note 19,
at 755 (requirement has little relationship to an individual attorney's competence). The
main justification for the prior practice rules, a state's ability to oversee an attorney for a
substantial amount of time, will become much less relevant if disciplinary actions are
reported on an interstate basis. See infra note 137.
129. Many states have found that reexamination of an out-of-state attorney's legal
knowledge is unnecessary. See Hafter, supra note 28, at 5. "Thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia presently admit out-of-state attorneys without additional examina-
tion on their legal knowledge, provided that the attorney has practiced in another juris-
diction for a prescribed period of time, is in good standing in the state of prior admission,
and meets certain additional requirements." Id.
130. After determining the importance of association with local counsel in a particu-
lar case, the court would then assign the local counsel one of many possible roles. For
example, local counsel could serve as a "mail drop," as a person with whom the court
and opposing counsel could "readily communicate," as "co-counsel," or as "co-equal" or
"lead" counsel. It should also be made clear what liability the local counsel assumes in
each of these roles. E. MICHELMAN, supra note 69, at 9-10; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5
ch. 1 App. 1 § 5 (1984). An out-of-state attorney is not required to associate with an
Oklahoma attorney if the out-of-state attorney's home state does not require an
Oklahoma attorney representing a client in a court of that state to associate with a resi-
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tion of local counsel.1 3' The court would consider many different
factors including the difference between Illinois law and the law of
the state in which the attorney is licensed. 132 Whether the out-of-
state attorney has previously practiced in Illinois is also important,
especially if the previous case is similar to the current case. 33 The
court will compare the advantages of association with local counsel
with the burden it will cause the Illinois client. 134
dent attorney. The state has, however, the discretionary power to require association with
local counsel regardless of the pro hac vice rules of the out-of-state attorney's home state.
Id. In any instance where it becomes reasonably apparent, before or during the trial of
any cause or proceeding, that the assistance of a member of the Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion is necessary to the proper and orderly administration of justice, the court may re-
quire the employment of an active member of the Oklahoma Bar Association. Id. The
state also has the power to require the associate counsel to be chief counsel if the court
finds that the out-of-state attorney has engaged in disorderly or disruptive tactics which
interfere with the proper and efficient conduct of the proceedings. Id. This Oklahoma
statute is an example of a statute that gives the court discretionary power to determine
when association with local counsel is needed and to determine what role the local coun-
sel should play. An alternative to association of local counsel would be for the court or
agency to give the out-of-state attorney a special examination that would be focused on
the area of the law in which the out-of-state attorney plans to practice. Brakel & Loh,
supra note 4, at 711-12 (special examination of foreign applicants is conceptually and
practically the most appropriate procedure); see, e.g., Wash. Ct. R. 4(B) (Rule for Admis-
sion to Practice) (Washington has two different examinations: general applicant's exami-
nation and an attorney applicant's examination).
131. Thirty-five jurisdictions currently require the pro hac vice applicant to associate
with local counsel. Illinois is only one of nine jurisdictions that impose no restrictions on
the exercise of the court's discretion in granting pro hac vice admission. E. MICHELMAN,
supra note 69, at 5. See generally Brakel & Loh, supra note 4, at 705. "The most compel-
ling reason for the requirement is the assumption that local counsel will assure or en-
hance competence in representation - competence in dealing with local laws and
procedures and perhaps in handling local conditions, personalities, customs and
prejudices." Id. Association with local counsel also enhances the chances of remedial
enforcement for the state of the client. Id. For examples of relevant state statutes, see
e.g., S. CT. R. 13, in 22 S.C. CODE ANN. at 93 (Law Co-op 1977) (any attorney from
another state may be admitted pro hac vice to participate in the trial or argument of any
particular cause in which he is associated with a member in good standing of the Bar of
this State.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-104 (1982); ARIZ. S. CT. R. 28(c).
132. For example, the court should take into consideration what type of client is
requesting the authorization of an out-of-state attorney. See supra note 58 and accompa-
nying text. The court should consider the client's need for the state's protection. Id. If
the client is a corporation who is trying to use its general counsel, then the court should
be more likely to authorize the out-of-state attorney. See supra note 76 and accompany-
ing text.
133. Cf. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Il1. 1975).
Although the Beatty court did not allow out-of-state attorneys to participate in a case,
the court did consider the fact that the attorneys had been permitted to appear without
limitation numerous times in the past. Id. at 237.
134. Courts must be careful not to overuse the association with local counsel require-
ment because it has a clear economic effect on the desirability of retaining out-of-state
counsel. Few clients can afford to pay legal fees to both the desired out-of-state counsel
and to a local attorney. Comment, supra note 19, at 754.
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Ideally, this procedure should be developed as a model rule to be
adopted by all the states. 135  Such a model rule would provide at-
torneys with a practical way of obtaining authorization to practice
law in another state on a temporary basis. It will protect citizens
more effectively than the current rules by providing for the regula-
tion of all out-of-state attorneys who practice in another state even
when they do not plan to appear in court. This procedure should
also encourage compliance because it is not overly burdensome on
out-of-state attorneys, especially if they have practiced in that state
previously. 136 The model rule will provide for an improved inter-
135. Although this note has focused on the Illinois rules of admission, most of the
same arguments can be used to show how the admission rules of other states are also
outdated and overburdensome. See Wilkey, Proposal for a "United States Bar", 58
A.B.A. J. 355, 356 (1972) (where Chief Justice Warren Burger was quoted as saying:
"The licensing and admission power over lawyers vested in each of the 50 state jurisdic-
tions, 93 federal districts and 11 circuits, has led to a hodgepodge of standards for admis-
sion and regulations that are desperately in need of careful re-examination."). An
effective updating of the standards regarding admission will require participation by
many states. Although under this note's proposal a state retains substantial authority to
regulate the practice of law, it could be considered a liberal standard because it provides
an out-of-state attorney with a greater opportunity to practice law in another state.
The model rule proposed here would establish some broad guidelines for a state to
follow when an out-of-state attorney tries to obtain authorization to practice law on a
limited basis. The rule would also create a definition of "practicing law in another state"
so that attorneys would know when their actions require the authorization of another
state. The model rule would suggest factors that a court or agency would consider in
determining whether, and under what conditions, to grant pro hac vice admission.
Although for many states, including Illinois, this procedure will restrict the existing
broad judicial discretion, courts will retain substantial power to register and regulate out-
of-state attorneys. Smith, supra note 11 at 559-60.
It is time for the states to adopt consistent approaches, for a uniform practice
of law act, or in those states where it is appropriate, a uniform practice of law
rule. My preference is a national practice of law act to be enacted by the states,
and it is my hope that the organized bar will support a nationwide effort to
secure its adoption.
Id. at 560. "Registration and regulation almost certainly will protect the state's interest
in most cases." Id. at 559; see also E. MICHELMAN, supra note 69, at 14-15.
One worthwhile reform might be a uniform definition of the practice of law
as it applies to lawyers rendering legal services in an interstate context. . . .In
addition, uniform and centralized administrative structures could be developed
which encourage greater consistency and adherence to precedent or policy in
the granting of pro hac vice. . . .These reforms should be made in the context
of others which adequately safeguard the interest of the local forum in the
competent and ethical conduct of lawyers.
Id.
136. This limited authorization to practice law in Illinois need not always be given on
a case-by-case basis. For example, out-of-state corporate counsel who does legal work in
Illinois should not have to apply for pro hac vice for every case. The court should have
the power to grant a limited license to out-of-state attorneys in certain situations. If the
out-of-state attorney fulfills all the requirements, the court would be able to authorize
him to practice law in Illinois for a stated number of years as long as he practices law for
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state system of reporting disciplinary actions taken against out-of-
state attorneys. 3 7 It will, to an extent, limit the court's discre-
tion '3  because it outlines the three factors relevant to the court's
determination. Limitation of the court's discretion should, how-
ever, enhance the predictability of when admission will be granted
and the process should become more efficient. 3 9 Moreover, the
court will retain some discretion in its effort to determine whether
association of local counsel is required and to what extent.
the corporation and does not violate any disciplinary rule. Brakel, supra note 1, at 1084-
87; Brakel & Loh, supra note 4, at 710. "A type of limited licensing, confined to the
business that necessitates the interstate practice, is also a possibility." Id.
137. The model rule should require that all convictions of an attorney either be re-
ported to the attorney's home state disciplinary commission or to a national data base,
such as the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility. See THE CLARK REPORT, supra
note 23. The committee recommends the establishment of a National Discipline Bank to
which every court and administrative agency should report all formal disciplinary meas-
ures imposed against attorneys for dissemination to every disciplinary agency within the
United States. Id. at 158; see also E. MICHELMAN, supra note 69, at 34 n.165.
Michelman noted that "the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility currently re-
leases disciplinary information regarding specific individuals upon written request and
might thus be equipped to serve as a national clearinghouse to assist in pro hac vice ad-
ministration." Id. This will be an improvement because currently states like Illinois do
not require disciplinary actions against an out-of-state attorney to be reported to his
home state or to other states in which he is licensed to practice. Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 768 only requires the clerk of the court to notify Illinois state and federal courts of
any disciplinary action taken against an attorney. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 768, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 1 10A, 768 (1983). "As a practical matter the Attorney Registration and Discipli-
nary Commission will usually try to report the disciplinary action to the out-of-state
attorney's home state if possible. Often the Commission is unable to report these discipli-
nary actions because they do no know what other states the attorney is licensed to prac-
tice." Telephone interview with Jim Grogan, Senior Counsel, Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (March 22, 1985). The reason the commis-
sion often does not know in which states an out-of-state attorney is licensed is that the
Illinois pro hac vice rule, Supreme Court Rule 707, does not require a written petition
with such information from an out-of-state attorney. According to the Illinois pro hac
vice rule, it is fully within the court's discretion to decide whether to require an out-of-
state attorney to give any information at all. See supra note 41.
138. According to many commentators, the broad discretion vested in the trial judge
to grant pro hac vice admission can have a substantially negative effect on interstate
commerce. An out-of-state attorney may be discouraged from accepting a case in an-
other jurisdiction because there is a chance he will not be admitted even though he is
competent and has all the other prerequisites of an attorney in good standing. As a
result, the client may be forced to hire an in-state attorney. Comment, supra note 19, at
753-54. Illinois' rule grants broad discretion to the trial judge. See supra notes 41 and 81.
It is the position of this note that the expanded pro hac vice model rule proposed here
should effectively solve this problem since it limits the trial judge's discretion to grant pro
hac vice.
139. Hahn v. Boeing Co., 95 Wash. 2d 28, 33, 621 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (1980) (criti-
cizing the trial court's excessive discretion in granting pro hac vice admission as being
inefficient).
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Enforcement of Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules
An effective way for the courts to enforce the rules is critical to
the success of any proposal for the authorization of out-of-state
attorneys. It has been difficult for courts to discipline out-of-state
attorneys who practice law in Illinois without any authorization. 4°
The state should do three things in attempt to deter such
violations. II
The state should first establish a standard definition of unauthor-
ized practice of law in Illinois which will encompass any work
done in Illinois by an unauthorized out-of-state attorney which re-
quires the use of legal knowledge or reasoning. 42 The state should
140. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
141. It is the position of this note that although the enforcement of any admission
rule is a problem that cannot be fully solved,the state of Illinois can still considerably
improve the enforcement of its admission rules.
142. Other states have had to deal with the conflict between restrictive admission
regulations and the interstate practice of law. The New Jersey Supreme Court has recog-
nized that multistate relationships are a common part of today's society and should be
dealt with in a common sense fashion. In re Estate of Waring, 47 N.J. 367, 221 A.2d 193
(1966). "While the general public is entitled to full protection against unlawful practi-
tioners, their freedom of choice in the selection of their own counsel should be highly
regarded and not burdened by 'technical restrictions which have no reasonable justifica-
tion.'" Id. at 375, 221 A.2d at 197. (quoting New Jersey State Bar Ass'n. v. Northern
N.J. Mtge. Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 437, 161 A.2d 257, 261 (1960)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that an unauthorized New York attorney was
entitled to his legal fees from a New Jersey client for legal work done in New Jersey.
Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 313, 204 A.2d 146 (1964). Although the court recognized the
general principle that legal services for New Jersey residents relating to New Jersey mat-
ters may be furnished only by New Jersey counsel, the court noted that there may be
instances justifying exceptional treatment and the ignoring of state lines. Exceptional
treatment is justified when the legal work involves transactions in two or more states, and
when as a practical matter the transactions are inseparable. Id. at 316-17, 204 A.2d at
147-48.
Two years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a New York law firm was
entitled to fees for services rendered in the administration of an estate, even though that
firm had no authorization to practice in New Jersey. In re Estate of Waring, 47 N.J. 367,
221 A.2d 193 (1966), emphasized the fact that the New York firm worked with a New
Jersey law firm. The New Jersey law firm was retained to provide assistance with local
law aspects of the estate, the New York firm limiting itself to general supervision and
federal taxation questions. Id. at 377, 221 A.2d at 198.
The court in Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966), also
W Galflw u inatfou a way tuutuiLc ouL-Ul-MtLe attorney to recover his iegai fees. The
court limited its holding to a situation in which a citizen has invited a duly licensed out-
of-state lawyer to work in association with a local lawyer on a federal claim or defense.
Id. at 166-67.
It appears that these courts realized that it is impractical to apply restrictive admission
standards in every case. They have tried to create short-term solutions to the problem by
developing exceptions to the general rule. Brakel & Loh, supra note 4, at 724. "The New
Jersey cases are not founded on a clear and consistent rationale, but perhaps can be ex-
plained by the commonsense, but analytically unhelpful, proposition that unnecessary
1985] Pro Hac Vice Model Rule Proposal
also impose severe consequences on any violation of its admission
rules. 43 In addition to obtaining an injunction to discontinue the
unauthorized practice of law, the state should more frequently im-
pose punishment for contempt of court.144 Since the punishment
imposed for contempt is within the discretion of the court, the
court can impose a fine, a jail sentence, or both. 45  The state
should additionally encourage all attorneys who have knowledge
that another lawyer is practicing law in Illinois without authoriza-
tion to inform the appropriate professional authority.
1 46
hardship to clients or lawyers ought to be avoided." Id. Brakel and Loh noted that there
is very little connection between the rules adopted by those courts and the fundamental
rationale behind multistate practice regulation - assuring lawyer competence and integ-
rity. Id.; see also Comm. on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar
Ass'n, Formal Op. 80-44 (1980). "An attorney practicing in a Minnesota border commu-
nity has the right and perhaps even the responsibility to counsel Iowa residents who seek
the attorney's advice, but the attorney may not represent a client before an Iowa tribunal
without first being admitted to practice in Iowa. Neither may the attorney perform a
principal service in Iowa for his client, who is a resident of Iowa, without first being
admitted to practice." Id.
This note contends that to allow an out-of-state lawyer to go to another state and
practice limited types of law without any authorization is not the proper solution to the
interstate practice of law problem. Such a solution subjects the citizens to a higher
chance of obtaining an incompetent out-of-state attorney because the state will not be
reviewing the out-of-state attorney's records when the attorney plans to practice law on a
limited basis. It also poses the problem of where to draw a line between when an out-of-
state attorney is required to obtain authorization and when he is not. Such a solution
would be difficult to enforce in a consistent manner.
143. The courts should continue to refuse to enforce contracts for attorney fees if the
attorney was not authorized to practice law in Illinois. See supra note 51.
144. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, 1 (1983).
145. Id.; see supra note 7.
146. DR 1-103(A) states: "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation
of DR 1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon such violation. MODEL CODE DR 1-103. EC 1-4 states:
The integrity of the profession can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers
in violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the attention of the proper
officials. A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to those officials all unprivileged
knowledge of conduct of lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of
the Disciplinary Rules. A lawyer should, upon request, serve on and assist
committees and boards having responsibility for the administration of the Disci-
plinary Rules.
Model Code EC 1-4; see also MODEL CODE EC 1-6 (lawyers should be diligent in taking
steps to see that during a period when a lawyer is disqualified that such lawyer is not
practicing law); MODEL CODE Canon 3 (a lawyer should assist in preventing the unau-
thorized practice of law). See generally Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Re-
port Other Lawyers' Breaches of Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV.
95, 99 (most complaints about the unauthorized practice of law are filed by lawyers or
judges); Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct, 20 ARIz. L. REV.
509, 513 (1978) (survey exploring the willingness of lawyers to report their peers' miscon-
duct to the appropriate disciplinary authorities).
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CONCLUSION
The interstate practice of law has become necessary in order to
meet the needs of an increasingly mobile society. The Illinois rules
that regulate the admission of out-of-state attorneys are impracti-
cal and difficult to enforce. They also unnecessarily restrict an Illi-
nois citizen's right to counsel. By implementing an admission
process which encourages out-of-state attorneys to obtain admis-
sion under an expanded pro hac vice procedure and by strictly en-
forcing the rules, Illinois will have adopted an up-to-date
admission procedure which effectively protects its citizens.
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